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Abstract 
We propose a framework for viewing action research (AR) by considering the level of criticality 
and the emphasis on methodological process. Specifically, we propose conventional AR, critical 
AR, and dialogic AR as three broad categories for considering AR. This framework is explored 
through discussing the philosophical foundations upon which these approaches rest and 
providing examples of AR studies and conceptual writings in the organizational change and 
development literature. This literature appears to be dominated by perspectives and discourses 
close to the conventional AR paradigm, which does not actively acknowledge value stances. A 
central point of the article is that dialogic AR, informed by pragmatic philosophy and 
philosophical hermeneutics, represents an emerging, promising perspective. Dialogic AR’s 
primary concern is to create understanding and mutual learning in and through dialogue while 
also leading to practical solutions. Practical implications of dialogic AR are also considered, in 
particular the conditions that need to be present for critical dialogue to flourish and the 
organizational realities that prevent such dialogue.  
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Introduction 
With continuously changing economic, political, and social environments, human 
resource and organization development (HROD) professionals often need to rethink methods of 
engagement within organizations. McLagan (1989) made this point by stating that flexibility in 
HROD practice is welcome and that HROD cannot be prescribed through a cookbook approach 
or in a set of procedures. At the same time, existing organizational research and theory 
oftentimes fails to reflect organizational realities. For example, the organization development 
(OD) and change literature often describes change in a linear fashion. Within this linear process, 
manipulation of variables is said to affect organizational change in the desired direction (e.g., see 
Porras & Silvers, 1991). However, as many OD practitioners and researchers confirm, 
organizational realities are complex and messy. Instead, change can be seen as a spiraling 
process in which practitioners seek to understand the context, take action, and understand what 
happened (Weick & Quinn, 1999). The spiraling process occurs in multiple, overlapping cycles. 
Action research has been adopted as the primary approach in organization development (OD) for 




In many HROD textbooks (Cummings & Worley, 2001; Swanson & Holton, 2001) and 
in some literature dealing specifically with AR (Cunningham, 1993, McNiff, Lomax & 
Whitehead, 1996), AR is presented as a specific technique or method to diagnose and solve 
organizational problems. In other words, authors tend to focus on describing what steps need to 
be followed, and subsequently develop models to illustrate that process. For example, Lewin’s 
(1947a) work has been commonly reduced to the famous “unfreeze, move, and re-freeze” model, 
which has become a dominant approach for viewing AR in the HROD field. Scholars have 
developed other AR models to guide the work of action researchers and OD practitioners. 
Typically the stages of the AR process in HROD include (1) an initial analysis and contracting 
phase, (2) joint diagnosis and feedback to the client, (3) planning and developing the appropriate 
intervention, (4) implementing it, and (5) institutionalizing and evaluating the intervention.  
There is no doubt that these AR models provide useful frameworks for AR and OD 
practice. In fact, all three orientations to AR discussed in this paper follow these or similar steps. 
However, AR is more than a method to diagnose and solve organizational problems, as 
predominately described in the HROD literature. In 2001, Swanson and Holton, two leading 
scholars in the HROD field, claimed that AR does not even constitute a research method. 
However, they have recently included an entire chapter on AR as a mixed method approach to 
conducting research in organizations (see Swanson & Holton, 2005). This might point to a 
change of thinking and an increasing acknowledgement that AR is not just a problem solving 
technique. The AR literature has long moved beyond this narrow conceptualization of AR by 
stressing that AR is not just another method in the repertoire of organizational consultants and 
researchers. Instead, AR is a particular way of thinking about and acting in human inquiry, a 
worldview which expresses itself in a specific set of practices, and a collaborative process of 
mutual and liberating inquiry (Greenwood & Levin, 1998; Gustavsen, 1992; McArdle & Reason, 
2008; Reason & Bradbury, 2001). These ideas seem to suggest that in addition to solving 
problems, the potential of AR lies in the creation of mutual understanding and learning in and 
through dialogue, critical reflection, and action. This perspective is sometimes ignored by purely 
procedural and instrumental conceptualizations of AR that dominate HROD research and 
practice.  
In addressing these issues, we begin with an overview of historical origins of AR that, in 
our judgment, have left their mark on how AR is approached in HROD today. Next, we 
introduce a framework of AR practices, which is used to classify different emphases of AR 
practice within HROD. The framework highlights two spectrums of AR practice, namely the 
methodological process of inquiry and the level of critical intensity. Within this framework, we 
propose three possible categories for approaching AR: conventional AR, critical AR, and 
dialogic AR. Dialogic AR is an emerging perspective, which we explore more deeply than the 
other two perspectives. We provide three examples of dialogic AR in organizational settings, 
before our concluding discussion which considers the promises and challenges of the respective 
approaches to AR. 
 
Origins of Action Research  
When considering the history of AR, individuals such as John Collier and John Dewey or 
more recently, Chris Argyris and Stephen Kemmis have shaped the various branches of AR. 
However, we limit our discussion to Kurt Lewin and the social scientists at the Tavistock 
Institute of Human Relations. In our view, these ideas still exert a major influence on how AR is 




Kurt Lewin. To our knowledge, Lewin wrote only two papers that specifically address 
action research (see Lewin, 1946, 1947b). Nonetheless, he is often credited with coining the term 
AR and is considered the father of AR (Cunningham, 1993; Greenwood & Levin, 1998; Marrow, 
1958). His historical significance in this field likely results from his longstanding attention to 
integrating social theory and action, in order that the abstract and the concrete were no longer 
separated. Lewin saw AR as a way to solve practical problems such as easing racial tensions and 
addressing problems faced by minorities, in addition to providing a basis for formulating general 
laws that influence group life (Lewin, 1948a). In Lewin’s view, the site of social problems 
should be the site of social science research. Instead of studying the behavior of individuals and 
groups from a disengaged and distant perspective, Lewin practiced an experimental approach in 
field settings. He brought scientists and local actors together in an effort to both understand and 
address the problems people were facing in their everyday lives and practices.  
Lewin greatly influenced OD practice with his conceptualization of change as a three-
stage process consisting of the unfreezing, moving, and refreezing phases. In order to explain the 
causes and drivers of behavioral change, Lewin drew on field theory from the physical sciences 
(Lewin, 1947a, 1936). More specifically, Lewin described human behavior as a function of a 
person interacting with the environment. The so-called life space is one of the key concepts of 
this theory. Lewin contended that the life space consists of a person’s psychological 
environment, including goals, desires, needs, and anxieties. It is the composite of one’s 
psychological past, present, and future, and it determines people’s behavior at any given moment 
(Lewin, 1943). The Lewinian model of change rests on the assumption that a person or a social 
system remains in its current state (i.e., the field of forces remain in equilibrium) unless there is 
some kind of confrontation or external stimulus. Therefore, a destabilization of the status quo, or 
unfreezing, is the first necessary step to affect behavioral change. Lewin (1947a) stated that “to 
break open the shell of complacency and self-righteousness it is sometimes necessary to bring 
about deliberately an emotional stir-up” (p. 35). However, the individual life space and/or a 
group’s social space are influenced by both helping and restraining forces. These forces either 
support or hinder a shift from a lesser to a more desired state. Once identified, the movement or 
change from an existing state to a more desired state requires an intentional alteration of the field 
forces in order to create disequilibrium. This moving phase can be accomplished by reducing the 
opposing forces or adding forces that facilitate a movement in the desired direction. Once the 
desired state is reached, specific actions are necessary to re-freeze the new state and new 
behavior. This re-freezing is necessary because individuals and groups can regress to previously 
undesired states like moving from a high performance state back to a previous low performance 
state.  
Levin (1994) claimed that this model still guides most OD practitioners’ consulting work 
in the United States. The Lewinian change model has been criticized for conceptualizing 
organizational change as a short-term intervention or a single event that is brought about 
intentionally (Greenwood & Levin, 1998; Marshak, 1993; Weick & Quinn, 1999). Alternative 
conceptualizations see change as incremental, evolving, and continuous. In Greenwood and 
Levin’s (1998) view, AR should be a vehicle for continuous, sustained change, and participative 
learning with a greater emphasis on ongoing dialogue.  
Lewin’s experimental approach also has some resemblance to traditional social science 
methods in that the social scientist was largely in control of the research process (Greenwood & 
Levin, 1998). Like conventional social scientists, he was clearly interested in establishing causal 




departure from that of other social scientists. Instead of conducting distant and disengaged 
studies of social phenomena that could be quantified and measured, he emphasized the study of 
intersubjective meanings of local actors. Even though it might seem that Lewin was mainly 
interested in behavioral change, he viewed change as a process of re-education “in which 
changes of knowledge and beliefs, changes of values and standards, changes of emotional 
attachments and needs, and changes of everyday conduct occur” (Lewin, 1948b; p. 58). This 
belief is evident in one of Lewin’s most famous contributions to the field of group dynamics, the 
so-called Training Groups or T-Groups, which provide an early foundation for contemporary 
dialogic approaches to AR. During a workshop aimed at training staff to address intergroup 
tensions, Lewin and his associates discovered the importance of providing feedback about 
individual behavior in groups (NTL Institute, 2008). The feedback and the facilitated group 
dialogue turned out to be a rich learning experience about issues such as interpersonal relations, 
personal growth, and leadership. Subsequently, T-Groups were designed as relatively 
unstructured small-group sessions without pre-defined agendas during which individuals would 
share their experiences in order to gain insight about their own and others’ behavior. This 
process could lead to better interpersonal relations within the group. Other outcomes associated 
with T-Groups are increased openness, awareness, open communication, and increased listening 
skills (Cummings & Worley, 2001).  
Tavistock Institute. In Great Britain, shortly after World War II, a group of researchers 
joined together and became known as the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations. The British 
government called upon these researchers as part of the efforts to rebuild the British industrial 
base after the war. In comparison to the early as well as present action research tradition in the 
United States, there was a greater emphasis on issues of workplace democracy in Great Britain 
(Greenwood & Levin, 1998). In fact, the researchers at the Tavistock Institute were greatly 
responsible for the emergence of the industrial democracy movement, which advocated greater 
participation of workers in industrial decisions that affect their working lives. For instance, 
Tavistock researchers studied the link between industrial democracy and efficiency at Glacier 
Metal Company. This was one of the first studies in which management, labor, and social 
scientists worked closely together in an effort to remove inequalities and injustices. Action 
research methods were also employed when Tavistock researchers found that an organization can 
be more effective when the technical system of production and the prevailing social system are 
considered simultaneously. This often-cited research from coal mines is the foundation of the 
theory of organizations as socio-technical systems (Trist & Bamforth, 1951). Further developed 
by Emery (1959), it represented a major departure from theories which focused mainly on 
designing work flows according to technical requirements (i.e., scientific management). The 
differences in performance between high-performing and low-performing coal-mines, which 
employed the same technology, was explained by the differing work arrangements. For example, 
in the high-performing groups, leaders turned to employees for advice in implementing new 
technology. In the low-performing teams, employees merely followed the instructions of 
industrial engineers who lacked hands-on work experience in that environment.  
The distinctive features of both Tavistock’s and Lewin’s approaches to studying social 
phenomena was to closely relate knowledge and action and a commitment to collaboration. Their 
aim was to generate knowledge relevant to the specific circumstances that social groups were 
facing, and in Lewin’s case, also developing general laws of group life. 
Current AR Approaches in HROD. Although neither Lewin nor the Tavistock 




strongly believed in and were committed to democratic ways of organizing and leading groups 
and organizations. In advocating democratic approaches, these researchers strengthened the 
human relations movement, which is recognized as one of the foundations of the organization 
development (OD) field. They also influenced other organizational researchers and scholars such 
as Edgar Schein and Chris Argyris.  
In spite of the humanistic value orientation that many HROD professionals undoubtedly 
have, their practices often leave little room for dialogue. We argue that dialogue is necessary for 
a more critical engagement with organizations. It seems reasonable to assume that HROD 
consultants could lose for-profit corporations as clients if they engage in overt emancipatory or 
consciousness raising approaches to organizational change. For similar reasons, academic 
researchers would experience resistance in gaining access to organizations if they take such 
approaches. The power-dominated discourse setting (i.e., the manager-worker relationship), 
organizations’ tendency toward conservatism, and management’s fear of the potentially 
subversive effect of dialogue (Factor, 1994), are all strong forces working against dialogic and 
critical modes of engagement. As an additional barrier to critical modes of engagement, research 
and science in organizational studies is still heavily influenced by positivist approaches which 
emphasize value-neutral research and prioritize the building of theory over engagement in 
organizations. Under such approaches, disengaged researchers affect practice by developing 
theories through their own judgment, which are “tested” later in real-world practice (Torraco, 
1997). As part of the process of emulating natural science and its tendency toward accumulative 
predictive theories, researchers have sometimes been pressured to present AR using conventional 
reporting styles, essentially sanitizing the action out of the report (Dick, 1999; Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
In light of these issues, it is not surprising that most HROD researchers and practitioners 
have “chosen” a predominately value-neutral, process-oriented reading of Lewin’s model of 
change. However, as we explain later, conventional approaches, which tend not to acknowledge 
and inquire into research participants’ value stances, beliefs, feelings, and assumptions, can be 
combined with other approaches to AR in politically savvy ways. These approaches can provide 
organizations with more complex and sustainable results, in addition to facilitating more humane 
workplaces and societies.  
Approaches to Action Research 
Action research draws on a wide range of philosophical frameworks, resulting in a 
variety of approaches to doing AR. Reason and Bradbury (2001) stated that AR’s theoretical and 
philosophical roots lie primarily in pragmatic philosophy, critical thinking, social constructionist 
theory, systems theory, the practice of democracy, and, more recently complexity theory. 
According to Reason and Bradbury, the refusal to adopt one single theoretical and philosophical 
perspective “can be seen as an expression of a post-modern sentiment” (2001, p. 3). However, it 
seems that AR, as it is understood, talked about, and practiced in HROD, has not been heavily 
influenced by these perspectives. It is widely perceived as a method to solve organizational 
problems (e.g., see Akdere, 2003; Cummings & Worley, 2001; Swanson & Holton, 2001).  
In order to structure the following discussion about various ideological readings of AR, 
we created a framework that considers both the degree of criticality and the emphasis on 
conventional scientific research methods in common approaches to AR (Figure 1). Horizontally, 
we consider the extent to which action researchers focus on classical methodological rigor, by 
drawing on Schwandt’s (1997) discussion about the nature of values in human inquiry. 
Vertically, we consider the levels of critical intensity in various approaches to AR by utilizing 




knowledge interests. Within this framework, we locate three broad categorizations of AR: 
conventional AR, critical AR, and dialogical AR. These broad categories include multiple types 
of approaches and techniques. We do not intend to imply a strict separation between the AR 
categories outlined below. There is considerable overlap between various categories since AR 
projects cannot be assigned neatly to specific categories. Additionally, these categories do not 
constitute three distinct and equal areas of AR practice that each follow different sets of 
practices. Nonetheless, as we will attempt to demonstrate, some AR projects display more 
tendencies toward certain categories. These categories allow us to consider differing approaches 
on the basis of level of criticality and the emphasis on methodological process.   
 





























Conventional Action Research  
On our continuum of AR approaches, conventional AR represents a relatively uncritical 
mode of engagement. This approach to social inquiry emphasizes the role of an expert researcher 
who generates knowledge about an object of interest, in stark contrast to the dialogic AR 
approach discussed later (Schwandt, 1997). Furthermore, conventional AR is supposed to be 
approached from a value-neutral attitude, which can frequently be observed in consulting 
relationships. However, when researchers and consultants take a value-neutral stance, we argue 
Emphasis on Classical  


















that they primarily serve the interests of management. Thus, more often than not solutions are 
pursued that reflect the values of management and those of the AR practitioner who applies his 
or her knowledge and expertise to the issue at hand. Their decisions and actions are to some 
degree influenced by their own value stances, but these do not tend to be openly reflected upon 
and discussed. This value-neutral orientation also dominates the social sciences where 
researchers often attempt to keep the social world under investigation at arms’ length and claim 
to be objective, emotionally detached, and describe the world “as it is.” This position is 
sometimes referred to as “naturalism” because the social scientist borrows methods from the 
natural sciences. This point of view was articulated by the social scientists and philosophers 
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and Emile Durkheim (1858-1917). Both argued that the primary 
goal of the social scientist is to explain and predict the social world. The nature of social reality 
is assumed to be fundamentally stable, enduring, and “out there” (Sussman & Evered, 1978), and 
the kind of knowledge produced is primarily procedural and technical. These ideas represent an 
empirical-analytical approach to research which is dominated by a technical, instrumental, or 
means-end knowledge interest (Habermas, 1971). This interest aims at mapping and controlling 
social and natural processes, and finding generalizable laws. Within our proposed framework, 
this knowledge interest represents the lowest levels of criticality because there tends to be little 
to no space for questioning existing systems and/or practices.  
Kemmis (2001) pointed out that there are literally thousands of examples of AR which fit 
this paradigm. He explained that this type of AR seeks to solve problems and fulfill goals 
predetermined before the project begins. These goals are not necessarily questioned. For 
example, French and Bell (1999) define action research as 
the process of systematically collecting research data about an ongoing system, relative to 
some objective, goal, or need of that system; feeding these data back into the system; 
taking actions by altering selected variables within the system, based both on the data and 
on hypotheses; and evaluating the results of actions by collecting more data (p. 130). 
Another illustration of this rather uncritical problem solving approach can be found in Akdere’s 
(2003) conceptual article, which suggests an integration of the AR paradigm in organizational 
training and development activities. While acknowledging the humanistic and democratic value 
orientation of AR, he repeatedly describes AR as a problem-solving technique aimed at 
improving organizational performance. When comparing the roles of action researchers to that of 
trainers, Akdere (2003) stated that they share the aim of “helping employees identify and adopt 
more efficient ways of performing and operating job-related tasks” (p. 420). This view of action 
research is predominant in organizational consulting and consists of a relatively uncritical cycle 
of information gathering and feedback (Reason & Bradbury, 2001). McKernan (1991) referred to 
this type of AR as the scientific-technical view of problem solving and Grundy (1988) called it 
technical action research. The action researcher or the OD consultant assumes the role of an 
expert. Although stakeholders in the organization are involved in the research process and can 
directly communicate with the researcher/consultant, their participation is peripheral compared 
to other modes of action research. While this may sometimes be necessary due to practical 
considerations as the example below will illustrate, in other occasions opportunities for a more 
inclusive and reflective AR practice might be foregone under this approach. The intervention 
itself is usually short-term and aimed at fixing a problem. Lippitt and Lippitt (1978) stressed that 
this approach, with its emphasis on the role of the researcher/consultant as an expert may lead to 




As we pointed out earlier, AR studies often display characteristics that can be placed at 
various points in our proposed framework. Kowalski, Harmon, Yorks, and Kowalski (2003) 
provide one such example in their AR project that sought to reduce aggressive behaviors and 
stress in the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs (VA). It displays characteristics of conventional 
and value-neutral AR at the beginning stages, but as the project matured, the researchers 
employed more critical modes of engagement and less focus on the mechanics of the 
methodological process. A steering team consisting of academic researchers and higher-level VA 
members guided the three-year project. Local action teams at eleven different sites supported the 
activities of the project. Because of the high value placed on numerical data in the VA for 
decision making, the steering team used rigorous quantitative data collection and analysis 
techniques in the first stage data collection. In addition, the research team dealt with a culture in 
which employees typically asked for permission instead of acting independently. The steering 
team also had the technical responsibility of educating the local action teams about workplace 
stress and aggression issues. As a result of these circumstances, the action researchers had to 
initially assume the role of expert consultants, leaving virtually no space for dialogue or critical 
inquiry. This role changed significantly as the project moved forward, but their initial 
engagement with the VA did not include challenging of the existing culture and values. In the 
early phases of the project, we see a strong focus on methodological rigor and the creation of 
objective knowledge about the issue at hand (i.e., causes and effects of stress and aggression and 
their impact on business results within the VA). We argue that this part of Kowalski et al’s 
(2003) AR project corresponds to conventional AR. The steering team understood the realities of 
organizational practice, which demanded techniques closer to the conventional approach. AR 
practitioners’ values were certainly at play here (e.g., their preference for a democratic 
workplace, or their implicit assumption that better business results can be achieved in a less 
stressful environment), but these value stances were not actively acknowledged or discussed at 
this stage of the project. The case provides a good example of utilizing conventional approaches 
in one stage and dialogical AR in another stage, as we will explain later. 
The conventional approach to AR is often criticized by proponents of appreciative 
inquiry (AI) (e.g., Bushe, 1999; Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1987). AI stresses that it is the 
researcher’s duty to help make organizations and the individuals within organizations aware of 
the system’s life-giving forces by promoting positive values within the system. AI proponents 
see the problem-solving approach as based on logical positivist assumptions, in particular the 
assumption that there is a fundamentally stable psychological and social reality. They argue that 
this approach is of limited use for changing and transforming social systems, which results in 
significant changes in stakeholders’ points of view, preconceptions, priorities, identities, and 
relationships with each other. Positivist approaches ignore the power of language to create new 
social and psychological realities and to dramatically change practices.  
 
Critical Action Research 
Critical inquiry promotes a particular set of ideas and is essentially emancipatory and 
political in nature (e.g., AR practices based on feminist or Marxist theories). Participatory action 
research (PAR) often refers to AR carried out within this paradigm. Critical AR aims to create 
knowledge and results in action, but also aims to empower oppressed people, through the process 
of constructing and using their own knowledge (McArdle & Reason, 2008; Schwandt, 2001). 
According to Schwandt (1997), the conventional and the critical frameworks share a quest for 




regard to the type of knowledge being created. Critical AR aims at generating emancipatory 
knowledge that questions underlying ideologies and power structures, while the knowledge 
interest of the conventional approach is technical (Habermas, 1971). In both approaches, social 
research is a systematic and methodological process, although there is less emphasis on 
methodology in emancipatory forms of inquiry (Schwandt, 1997). Within HROD, critical 
approaches have gained more attention in recent years as a way of helping organizations to 
become more humane and ethical by considering societal issues as part of HROD practice (e.g., 
Fenwick, 2005). Critical approaches to AR provide one way of integrating these critical 
perspectives into actual HROD practice while minimizing the risk of elitism (Githens, 2007). 
However, critical projects can be difficult to undertake within some organizations, especially for-
profit companies. Fenwick (2004) argues for a focus on “small wins” by utilizing critical 
approaches in small-scale ways, in order to minimize risk to HROD practitioners (also see 
Meyerson & Scully, 1995). 
Kemmis’s (2001) work with Australian universities provides an example of critical AR. 
Kemmis’ work used Habermas’ theory of system and lifeworld to critique modern societies. 
Through these conceptual ideas, Habermas claimed that modern societies are characterized by a 
colonialization of the lifeworld by its rationalized systems such as bureaucracies and markets. 
These systems are dominated by money and power, which leads to disruptions of the 
communicative lifeworld. The lifeworld consists of contexts of meaning through which 
individuals understand and interpret their situation and environment (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 
2000). Additionally, the lifeworld facilitates the formation of identities and relationships to other 
people. Kemmis (2001) identified two sides of universities. The systems side operated according 
to one set of principles, with its tight monitoring of professors’ work through a focus on 
resources and expenses and university policies that restricted academic freedom. On the other 
side, the lifeworld or the social setting had quite different dynamics, ideas and values. Kemmis 
and his AR participants shed light on some of these relationships which impacted their lifeworld, 
such as the increasing amount of interpersonal conflicts resulting from these dynamics. This 
work mirrors Habermas’ (1971) emancipatory knowledge interest, which is characterized by 
deep reflection and critical inquiry in order to free individuals and organizations from false 
assumptions, ideological distortions, and social distortions.  
 
Dialogic Action Research 
Dialogic AR emphasizes the critical engagement of individuals, organizations, or 
communities when undertaking action-oriented investigations into organizational issues or 
problems. This engagement occurs through a critical reflection upon current practices, in 
particular through an examination of the beliefs, values, tacit assumptions, and mental models 
informing and shaping practices (Schwandt, 1997). Schwandt argues that dialogic and critical 
social inquiry share a commitment to matters of everyday life as opposed to focusing on finding 
solutions and solving social problems in goal-rational ways (i.e., asking how to best achieve a 
pre-determined goal without questioning the goals themselves). But a key distinction between 
dialogic and the other two approaches outlined earlier is the role of professional inquiry. 
Schwandt maintains that dialogic approaches abandon the concern with classic scientific method 
which characterize the conventional and to some extent the critical approaches. However, this 
does not mean that dialogic research approaches abandon method and the AR process altogether. 
On the contrary, the stages of a dialogically oriented AR project will most likely resemble that of 




techniques that lead participants to dialogue through inquiring into accepted norms and mental 
models and allowing them to question dominant values. This type of dialogue rarely occurs 
automatically or naturally. The emphasis on reflective practices, such as double-loop learning, 
also differentiates dialogic AR from conventional AR. To facilitate double-loop learning and to 
foster the dialogue process, Argyris, Putnam, and McLain Smith (1985), Argyris (1997), and Tee 
and Liang (2005) used specific methods to facilitate dialogue processes while exploring 
organizational development issues. Although these authors undertook specific steps and 
processes, the overarching “method” of dialogic research is the concern with inquiring into our 
values, assumptions, and preconceived notions about what is important. In other words, a central 
goal of the method is deep and sustained inquiry into “why” the inquiry itself is important 
(Friedman, Rothman, & Withers, 2006).   
In the dialogic research tradition, social inquiry is redefined “as a dialogical and 
reflective process of democratic discussion and philosophical critique” (Schwandt, 1997, p. 35) 
that is no longer preoccupied with generating knowledge about an object (e.g. human practices). 
Instead, it focuses on the cultivation of practical or hermeneutic knowledge, which seeks 
Verstehen or inter-human understanding both within and between cultures and may be achieved 
by entering into a dialogue. This knowledge is “useful to people in the conduct of their everyday 
lives” (Reason & Bradbury, 2001, p. 2) and practices. However, this kind of knowledge is not 
absolute, but is subject to change over time. Similarly, Flyvbjerg (2001), who critiques the 
classical method-driven social sciences seeking to emulate the natural sciences, calls for a social 
science that focuses on value-rational questions (e.g., questioning whether a certain goal is 
desirable and asking what should be done about it). According to Flyvbjerg (2001), the goal of 
such a science is to “produce input to the ongoing social dialogue and praxis in a society, rather 
than to generate ultimate, unequivocally verified knowledge” (2001, p. 139). Because inquiry of 
this kind does not explicitly seek emancipation and critique, but still might lead to critical 
reflection upon existing practices, we place it closer to the middle of the axis that represents the 
level of criticality (see Figure 1). 
Specifically, Greenwood and Levin’s (1998), Forester’s (1999), and Gustavsen’s (1992) 
approaches to AR fit this description, emphasizing the creation of arenas for dialogue as a 
medium for reflection, mutual learning, and democratization. These ways of doing AR represent 
relatively unexplored terrain in HROD. For the most part, they are informed by pragmatist and 
hermeneutic philosophy (in particular philosophical hermeneutics), and given their philosophical 
underpinnings, they take an anti-foundationalist stance epistemologically. Pragmatic philosophy, 
especially John Dewey’s and Richard Rorty’s works, has received attention by AR practitioners 
(Greenwood & Levin, 1998; Reason, 2003). However, Greenwood and Levin (1998) expressed 
their surprise that the work of philosophical hermeneuticists, in particular that of Gadamer, have 
not yet been examined by the AR community. There is considerable common ground between 
these philosophies, such as their emphasis on the practical and their rejection of Western 
dualisms such as the separation of mind and body, action, and thought. First, we examine 
definitions of dialogue, explore links between pragmatist philosophy and AR, and make 
suggestions as to how philosophical hermeneutics could inform a dialogic AR practice.  
What is dialogue? Isaacs (1993) defined dialogue as “a discipline of collective thinking 
and inquiry, a process for transforming the quality of conversation and, in particular, the thinking 
that lies beneath it” (p. 25). Edgar Schein (1993) referred to dialogue as a “communication 
technology…that focuses on getting in touch with underlying assumptions (especially our own 




(p. 43).. For Barge (2002) “dialogue is…a collective and collaborative communication process 
whereby people explore together their individual and collective assumptions and predispositions” 
(p. 168). Similarly, Ellinor and Gerard (1998) describe dialogue as: 
Seeing the whole rather than breaking it into parts; seeing connections rather than 
distinctions; inquiring into assumptions rather than justifying or defending them; learning 
through inquiry and disclosure rather than persuading, selling or telling; and creating 
shared meanings rather than gaining agreement on one meaning (p. 21). 
All of those definitions imply that dialogue can help a group of people generate shared 
understanding and learn together, and they point to the importance of surfacing individuals’ 
assumptions, values, and ways of thinking. This process is the distinguishing feature of dialogue 
not found in other forms of talk such as a negotiation, a debate, a personal quarrel, or idle chatter.  
Pragmatism. Pragmatism has been defined as “an approach to philosophy, primarily 
held by American philosophers, which holds that the truth or meaning of a statement is to be 
measured by its practical (i.e., pragmatic) consequences” (Pragmatism, 2002). To be more 
precise, pragmatists reject the notion that one infallible truth can be found by appealing to 
epistemological criteria. Rather, pragmatism suggests that truths are bound within everyday 
practices and concerns, validated by people’s experiences, fallible, and therefore always subject 
to further revisions. Knowledge, according to pragmatism, is highly practical and ought to be 
used to solve problems that affect social conditions. Thus, pragmatist philosophers refuse to 
separate theory from practice or thought from action. These characteristics explain to a large 
extent the appeal of pragmatism to AR practitioners. In particular, Greenwood and Levin (1998) 
have embraced pragmatism as a guiding philosophy of their approach to AR.  
Greenwood and Levin (1998) draw on John Dewey’s and Richard Rorty’s work in their 
explication of a pragmatic AR approach, particularly Rorty’s criticism of the epistemological 
project, which is a critique of modern philosophy’s aim to create well founded knowledge 
through a system of rigorous and reliable methods. Rorty advocated what he called edifying 
philosophy, which aimed to engage in ongoing conversation over finding objective truth. Put 
differently, the question of validity of knowledge cannot be addressed by imposing external 
criteria, but rather by a judgment in terms of its practicality, usefulness, and workability (Reason, 
2003). Workability refers to whether or not the actions arising from AR actually solve people’s 
initial problem(s). This judgment, according to Greenwood and Levine, is social and collective in 
nature. AR participants themselves are able to judge whether or not the solutions they put into 
practice resolve the issue they were faced with at the beginning. Greenwood and Levin (1998) 
also connect elements of Dewey’s pragmatism to AR. For example, they mention Dewey’s 
conceptualization of democracy as a continuous process of seeking societal improvement by 
collectively working with those at all levels of society, his strong belief that knowledge should 
not be separated from action, and his claim that all scientific knowing results from continuous 
cycles of action and reflection.  
Philosophical Hermeneutics and Dialogue. Philosophical hermeneutics (PH) is a 
philosophy concerned with the nature of (a) understanding and interpreting, (b) dialogue, and (c) 
the practical. Its most famous proponent is the German philosopher Hans Georg Gadamer (1900-
2002). Gadamer does not reject the application of scientific methods in our attempt to create 
understanding and knowledge in the human sciences. However, his ontological conception of 
human knowing and understanding addresses the limitations of scientific methods and the one-
sided view of what it means to know in the mainstream social sciences. In the mainstream social 




creates knowledge about an object, maintains objectivity vis-à-vis his or her research 
participants, and is in no way changed or influenced by what he or she is studying. Gadamer’s 
conception of knowing is not centered on the objective scientific grasp of an object, but rather on 
coming to an understanding with someone in dialogue in which both sides potentially learn and 
change (Smith, 2002; Taylor, 2002). Consequently, it is not the interpreter/researcher who 
decides the right or wrong interpretation or understanding. Rather, understanding is something 
that emerges in a dialogic relationship between dialogue partners (Schwandt, 2000). Gadamer 
(1992) claims that our understandings are subject to revision and are always tentative.  
Through a constant merging of perspectives, it is possible to generate new, shared 
understandings. For Gadamer (1992), understanding is not merely a cognitive process in which 
we grasp what others say. Rather, it is coming to a new and shared understanding of oneself, the 
other, and the subject matter through a transformation from earlier positions (Warnke, 1987). 
Gadamer also rejects the notion that we can understand the other by means of projecting 
ourselves into someone else’s mind. In his view, human understanding is constrained by our 
“horizon of understanding” (Gadamer, 1992), which consists of our knowledge, attitudes, values, 
beliefs, experiences, and preconceptions. According to Gadamer, we can neither rise above this 
horizon, nor can we project ourselves into someone else’s horizon. At best we can re-examine, 
put to test, and broaden our horizon as a result of a dialogue with the unfamiliar. We can never 
achieve a complete and final understanding. Thus, the dialogic meeting is central in order to 
reach a mutual and new understanding of the participants’ positions and the issue at hand. The 
view that dialogue can serve as a platform for the creation of common meaning and 
understanding is shared by organizational scholars (Isaacs, 1993; Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; Senge, 
1990). Consequently, shared meaning and understanding about the subject matter can only 
emerge in a dialogic encounter between dialogue partners (Gadamer, 2001). This dialogue 
meeting requires that dialogue partners acknowledge that they lack knowledge; are influenced by 
prejudices, need to listen to the other, and to be communicatively accessible; and need to be 
willing to risk confusion and uncertainty about themselves, the other and the issue at hand 
(Gadamer, 1992). Svenaeus (2003), applying Gadamer’s ideas to medical practice, wrote that 
“the clinical encounter can be viewed as a coming-together of two different attitudes and 
lifeworlds of doctor and patient aimed at understanding, which can benefit the health of the 
patient” (p. 416). In a similar fashion, when the AR practitioner meets with local participants and 
stakeholders, each party brings different horizons of understanding to the encounter. Typically, 
there is a fundamental asymmetry between professional action researchers and local participants 
in terms of knowledge about the specific problem and the skills necessary to overcome the 
problem. Through genuine dialogue, a common understanding of the issue can emerge, which 
eventually leads to mutual learning, decision making, and action. When this process of dialogue 
generation is integrated with pragmatist ideals, the end goal is an actual change in outcomes in a 
group, organization, or society. 
Dialogue to Surface Values. The conventional approach to AR has a tendency to ignore 
value orientations and commitments of some stakeholders (Bierema, in press). Specifically, 
participants, professional researchers, and local stakeholders represent a variety of value 
orientations and commitments that influence both the courses of action and the goals of a project. 
This tendency toward ignoring values results from the adoption of scientific-technical 
approaches to AR. These approaches originate in society’s larger instrumentalist tendencies that 
cause us to ask “how-to” questions, as opposed to exploring larger questions about meaning and 




surface. Hence, it creates the conditions for double-loop learning, which involves surfacing and 
re-evaluating our governing variables, assumptions, and beliefs that guide our actions. For 
instance, Karlsson (2001) stated that a dialogue “is an exchange of ideas and meanings that 
develops our thoughts and helps us to be aware of what we think and how we value things” 
(p.168). Isaacs (1993) quoted a manager of a steel mill reflecting on his experience of an 
organization development intervention based on the principles of dialogue:  
What we’ve done is to dedicate the time, to slow down and then create a space to listen to 
each other so that people can collectively learn the values of a lot of various people as 
opposed to the same people (Isaacs, 1993, p. 33).  
In summary, dialogue entails the need to challenge one’s current understandings and 
preconceived ideas which individuals have about themselves, the other, and about the particular 
issue or problem at hand (Gadamer, 1992). It requires interlocutors (i.e., those participating in a 
conversation) to remain open to information or ideas which do not fit their prior understanding, 
preconceptions, and preconceived ideas. During any AR project both the client and the 
researcher will encounter many situations which require such genuine openness. For instance, a 
group might be confronted with unexpected and uncomfortable feedback and information that 
challenges their core assumptions about the organization or social system. However, without the 
willingness to further explore the situation in light of this new revelation, any attempt to create a 
shared understanding based upon which action plans can be formulated will be futile. A 
willingness to scrutinize one’s foundational understandings and openness to abandon or modify 
them in light of new information or circumstances is a central idea in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. 
This requires listening to and conversing with others, while having an open attitude and mind. 
Eventually, consultants and others might revise their points of view and come to an improved or 
changed understanding of the subject or of themselves. Both Taylor and Gadamer imply that a 
change in these understandings might eventually lead to transformations in ourselves, in our 
identities, as well as in our relationships to others. This process very much resembles what might 
be defined as learning, both on an individual and on an organizational level. For instance, Brown 
and Starkey (2000) conceptualize organizational learning as “a virtuous circle in which new 
information is used to challenge existing ideas and to develop new perspectives on the future and 
new action routines through organizational dialogue” (p. 103). 
 
Examples of Dialogic AR 
Dialogic action research has recently been described as a particular approach to 
organization development that has dialogue as both its object and its method (Kristiansen & 
Bloch-Poulsen, 2004). Kristiansen and Bloch-Poulsen explain that in their dialogical approach to 
AR, organizational members are trained on how to engage in dialogue that eventually leads to 
practical solutions. Based on Gadamer (1992) and Buber (1967), they conceptualize dialogue as 
a process in which partners aim to create “a better understanding or to become wiser together” 
(p. 373). This process is characterized by participants’ willingness to share knowledge with one 
another, their willingness to risk and challenge their own and other’s assumptions, and a caring 
attitude that emphasizes honesty and forthrightness.  
 
Bang & Olufsen, Denmark 
By means of a first and second-person inquiry into the their assumptions, beliefs, values 
and mental models, Kristiansen and Bloch-Poulsen (2004) illustrated how unexamined and taken 




Danish company Bang & Olufsen. First, the researchers noticed that during supervision 
conversations between project managers and their supervising managers, the supervising 
managers interpreted their colleagues’ perspectives according to their own a-priori perspectives 
and ways of thinking. For example, one of the project managers pointed out to his supervising 
manager that lacking resources had been preventing him from successfully completing his tasks. 
The supervising manager, on the other hand, emphasized how successful the employee had been 
in getting things done and that he did not see a deficiency. Thus, the supervisor did not let the 
employee’s reality count at that moment. Secondly, after viewing video tapes of feedback 
conversations with research participants, the researchers realized that they could not fully 
appreciate and understand the research participants’ experiences either, for the same reason as 
the supervising managers could not. When referring to a conversation with a junior employee, 
Kristiansen and Bloch-Poulsen (2004) state that “We implicitly impose our ‘regime of truth’ on 
him instead of trying to co-develop or unfold his ability to take initiatives” (p. 380), which, in 
their view reduced the quality of this research. Nonetheless, the researchers engaged in a 
reflective process by considering their own pre-conceived ideas and assumptions and held 
conversations with research participants about their experiences, which opened up a dialogue 
about issues that had not surfaced previously. In particular, issues of managerial work life quality 
and health issues emerged. The authors summarize that “improved quality in our action research 
project depended on mutually risking ourselves as managers and action researchers. In those 
dialogic moments, we all became vulnerable human beings in search of improved quality of 
work life” (Kristiansen & Bloch-Poulsen, 2004, p. 385).  
Kristiansen and Bloch-Poulsen’s (2004) main focus was to illustrate the potential of 
reflective practices employed by the researchers and how these practices enabled dialogue. The 
knowledge that emerged from the dialogue was mainly about inter-human relationships and 
communication between researchers and research participants and among research participants 
themselves (i.e., project managers and their supervising managers), which clearly indicates a 
hermeneutic knowledge interest. The authors also illustrated how the imposition of their own 
perceptions and regimes of truth upon the research participants denoted an exertion of power. 
This insight reflects a somewhat more critical perspective, but it is directed mostly at their own 
practice as action researchers, and not at Bang & Olufsen’s way of doing business. While the 
authors did not explicate at length the research methods they employed, the reader can infer that 
they followed a plan to carry out and analyze this research. However, the researchers did not 
emphasize the use conventional scientific research methods typical of a data-oriented empiricist 
research approach. In the approach used, Kristiansen and Bloch-Poulsen were deeply engaged 
with the Bang and Olufsen managers and employees in conversations that helped the managers, 
employees, and researchers reflect on their practices and improve their communicative skills 
while challenging their assumptions, values, and ways of thinking. Thus, this study employs a 
dialogic way of knowing, a way of knowing that rejects the polarity between the observer and 
the observed in conventional scientific inquiry. Instead, researchers are required to surface their 
self-understandings, preconceptions, and prior knowledge and to critically examine their 
responses to what seems strange or unusual. For the abovementioned reasons we consider 
Kristiansen and Bloch-Poulsen’s (2004) study representative of dialogic AR. 
 
U.S. Veterans Administration 
While Kowalski, Haron, Yorks, and Kowalski’s (2003) AR study with the VA 




several characteristics of dialogic AR. The action researchers assumed less of an expert role and 
relinquished control to the local action teams. The action teams’ increasing levels of initiative 
and independence were largely the result of training interventions that focused on the project’s 
practices, methods, and other relevant issues. In particular, Kowalski et al. (2003) attribute much 
of the project’s success to the action teams using reflective techniques such as the Argyris’ 
Inference Ladder.  
When describing the work of one of the local action teams, the authors state that, 
“although the team does not talk explicitly about ’reflection and inquiry,’ team members do 
question each other's positions or views and bring sensitive issues into the open that before 
would have festered” (Kowalski et al., 2003, p. 48). The authors further report that these 
reflective practices, which are based on open and free exchange of ideas, feelings, and 
information (i.e., dialogue), changed the quality of conversations to more open, less judgmental 
and authoritative ways of communicating than existed before this intervention. There were also 
measurable work-life improvements in terms of labor-management relations, reductions in 
grievances and complaints, as well as reductions in reported sick leave. Lastly, the survey results 
confirmed linkages between workplace aggression, stress, and organizational performance. 
While this last finding represents knowledge about the issue at hand, or a technical knowledge 
interest, the researchers’ observations about improved work-life and quality of conversations 
reflect a hermeneutic knowledge interest. This improvement of everyday conditions was not a 
result of seeking control of or knowledge about social processes, but was attained through an 
emphasis on social competence and inter-human understanding. While not a defining 
characteristic of the AR project, we conclude that the knowledge created was also emancipatory 
in some regards, as it questioned existing ways of doing business inside the VA. One observation 
made by the authors warrants this assumption: “Senior leadership at some sites remained 
skeptical of the project's underlying counter-cultural values, and consequently less supportive. It 
would have been better to connect with leadership far earlier in the process” (p. 50). This case 
illustrates how AR projects may combine features of different AR approaches, and how they 
may be integrated in an AR project carried out in measurement-oriented organizational settings.  
 
The Swedish Leadership, Organization, and Codetermination Program 
Gustavsen (1992) reported on a large-scale program in Sweden co-sponsored by the 
Swedish Work Environment Fund and 150 participating organizations. The program aimed at 
developing new forms of work organization involving management, labor, and professional 
researchers from these organizations. He formulated a range of criteria for a democratic dialogue 
to occur. These criteria were not developed arbitrarily but against the backdrop of the theory of 
participatory democracy (Gustavsen, 1992). We provide some of the highlights of these 
principles (Gustavsen, 1992, p. 3): 
 The dialogue is a process of exchange: ideas and arguments move to and fro between 
the participants. 
 Everybody must be able to develop an understanding of the issues at stake. 
 All arguments that pertain to the issues under discussion are legitimate. No argument 
should be rejected on the ground that it emerges from an illegitimate source. 
 The workrole and authority of all participants can be a subject of discussion–no 
participant is exempt in this respect. 





 The dialogue must continuously produce agreements which can provide platforms for 
practical action.  
In order to make these and other principles of democratic dialogue actionable and 
operational in actual workplace change practice, Gustavsen (1992) proposed a number of 
specific strategies. For example, he proposed the use of dialogue conferences, which served as 
arenas or platforms for the exchange of ideas and experiences. These conferences were organized 
according to specific principles. For instance, two working modes were applied. First, 
discussions occurred in small groups. Conclusions were developed in the groups but presented 
later in large plenary sessions. Furthermore, lectures or other attempts to establish authority were 
not permitted during the conferences. Instead, talks could only be given in the form of brief 
comments regarding specific issues that emerged naturally from the conference. While 
Gustavsen remains skeptical that the above mentioned principles of democratic dialogue can be 
fully realized in working life, he emphasizes their importance as guiding and regulatory 
principles.  
Gustavsen’s (1992) principles of democratic dialogue provide an example of how AR 
practitioners can create conditions conducive to dialogue. Other organizational scholars, such as 
Ellinor and Gerard (1998) and Isaacs (1993) also provide specific guidelines for facilitating 
dialogue in OD interventions. For example, they explain the need for identifying and suspending 
one’s judgments, assumptions and certainties; suspending roles and status; listening to ones own 
listening and listening without resistance; slowing down the inquiry; respecting differences; and 
befriending polarization. Dialogic AR requires practitioners skilled at facilitating reflective 
discussions and dialogue, balancing the interests of various stakeholders, promoting critical 
inquiry into participants’ understanding of the issue, and practicing systemic thinking. Many 
HROD professionals possess these skills and could easily position themselves to facilitate 
dialogic AR. 
While we argue here that the expansive quality of dialogue may result in deep individual 
as well as organizational change and learning, we also acknowledge the importance of 
conversations that lead to problem solving and decision making. These conversations are often 
referred to as discussions (e.g., Barge, 2002, Isaacs, 1993) and, in contrast to dialogue, 
discussion has a funneling quality with the aim of narrowing things down in order to arrive at a 
specific course of action and/or decision. The need to make immediate decisions and to take 
action in modern organizations tends to favor discussions, and this often happens at the expense 
of dialogue. Nonetheless, discussions are essential to generate actions, but ideally they take place 
only after a careful consideration of multiple perspectives, values, assumptions and opinions 
which can be best achieved in and through dialogue. 
 
Conclusions 
We have presented three broad approaches to AR. The viability and practicality of each 
approach depends on the specific circumstances within an organization. Dialogic approaches to 
AR have not received much attention from academic HROD circles, given the often-cited 
criticism that AR in general is unscientific. From a practitioner point of view, the challenge to 
dialogic AR centers around OD practitioners’ need to respond to clients who want quick results 
and answers. Employees are tied up with their day-to-day work and cannot commit much time to 
participate in dialogue conferences and other similar activities. Additionally, some organizations 
might be reluctant to apply a dialogic approach because it clearly fosters individuals’ critical 




AR demonstrate, such approaches are feasible in organizational contexts, and HROD researchers 
and practitioners are not limited to pursuing conventional approaches to AR only.  
Opportunities exist for utilizing these approaches in smaller scale ways that might be less 
disruptive and time consuming to organizations. As Kowalski et al. (2003) show, these 
approaches can be combined with more conventional forms of AR in order to meet immediate 
organizational goals. Participative critical approaches can be combined with conventional 
approaches to lead to results that are sustainable, that benefit all stakeholders involved, and that 
produce more ethical, longer-term results. There also seems to be a greater interest in and 
openness to critical approaches in HROD (Fenwick, 2005). HROD professionals increasingly 
acknowledge that engaging with organizations raises moral, ethical, and political questions, 
which cannot be answered solely through technical empirical investigations. Instead, these issues 
need to be addressed within the context of a particular situation. As Karlsson (2001) argued, 
these questions deserve more careful, thoughtful, and reflexive consideration and dialogue could 
serve as an arena for such reflection and reconsideration. 
When considering the political risks involved in conducting critical AR within 
organizations (Githens, 2007), we conclude that dialogic AR may be a promising option to 
pursue in addition to or in combination with conventional AR. While the political risks involved 
in overtly conducting critical AR create challenges that can make it difficult practice, dialogic 
AR holds promise in allowing for exploration of critical issues in more subtle ways through the 
exploration of values, beliefs, assumptions, and feelings, attempting to achieve understanding, 
and focusing on transformation. Dialogic AR has great potential for both connecting with 
organizational goals and helping to create more humane workplaces.  
From a research perspective, it might be worthwhile to inquire into the extent that 
organizations with strict hierarchical structures and/or more authoritarian cultures are receptive 
to this dialogic engagement. In particular, a worthwhile line of inquiry could explore the small 
spaces in which dialogic AR is practiced within organizations with such cultures. Previous 
literature has explored the creation of entrepreneurial, counter-cultural spaces within 
bureaucratic organizations (Pinchot & Pellman, 1999). Forester’s (1999) PAR project in a 
community setting suggests that despite the high power differential between community 
members and those equipped with political power, the participatory AR process may result in 
more equitable relationships. Through future articles, sharing about AR projects, and ongoing 
dialogue about AR, HROD scholars and practitioners can challenge each other’s work and help 
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